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NOTES

THE JOBS ACT: INVESTOR PROTECTION,
CAPITAL FORMATION, AND EMPLOYMENT
IN AN INCREASINGLY POLITICAL ECONOMY
INTRODUCTION
On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (the JOBS Act or Act).1 The purpose of the Act was “[t]o
increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access
to the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”2 The Act
sought to lower the cost of raising capital by deregulating current securities
laws.3 It was passed against the backdrop of a classic struggle of balancing
free markets with investor protection, 4 a debate that was exacerbated by the
financial crisis and ensuing recession. 5
The main criticism of the Act alleged that decreased regulation would
lead to decreased investor protection and thus to increased fraud. 6 The
purpose of this Note is to show that this criticism is misplaced. A more
legitimate criticism of the Act should question the effect it will have on job
creation. The Note will accomplish this by arguing that (1) the JOBS Act,
by deregulating certain securities offerings, will have a positive impact on
capital formation without significantly impairing investor protection, and
(2) the Act, as drafted and sold to the public, may not actually increase
employment.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the federal securities laws as
well as the JOBS Act as a whole. Part II examines the background and
legislative history of three provisions that seem to have caused the most
1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. J. W ILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 4:2 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Enhanced Investor Protection After the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of David Massey,
President, North American Securities Administrators Association; Deputy Sec urities
Administrator of North Carolina) (discussin g the necessity of the investor protection provisions of
the Dodd-Frank Act).
6. See, e.g., Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to U. S. Senators T im Johnson &
Richard C. Shelby 1 (Mar. 13, 2012), available at http://www.aicpa.org/a dvocacy/issues
/do wnloada bledoc uments/404b/3-13-12_sec_chm_schapiro_letter_to_johnson.pdf (addressing the
JOBS Act and explaining how “ [t]oo often, investors are the target of fraudulent schemes
disguise d as investment opportunities”); Matt T aibbi, Why Obama’s JOBS Act Couldn’t Suck
Wo rse, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 9, 2012, 11:53 AM), http://www.rollin gstone.com/politics/blogs
/taibblog/why-obamas-jo bs-act-couldnt-suck-worse-20120409 (“T he ‘Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act’ . . . will very nearly legalize fraud in the stock market.”).
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commentary and controversy. This Part also analyzes the investor
protection mechanisms the Act provides. Part III discusses additional
investor protections outside the JOBS Act. In Part IV, this Note evaluates
the effect the Act will have on job creation and argues that deregulation will
not lead to a significant increase in employment. Finally, Part V reviews the
political climate surrounding the JOBS Act and provides some alternative
explanations of the Act’s true purpose.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND
THE JOBS ACT
A. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
The Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) requires that all
securities offered or sold must be registered with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (the SEC) or must fall under an exemption. 7 The
cost of registration can be prohibitively expensive, especially for small
businesses.8 The theory behind the registration process under the Securities
Act is to provide investors with disclosure, which grants investors access to
all material information required to make an informed decision. 9 While the
Securities Act governs a one-time disclosure for initial offerings, the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) requires continued
disclosure for companies with securities that trade in the secondary market
and have a certain number of shareholders and assets. 10 As with the
Securities Act, the goal of the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act
is to allow investors to accurately value a company’s shares. 11
B. OVERVIEW OF THE JOBS ACT
The JOBS Act expanded many existing exemptions and created several
new ones, thereby increasing access to capital for small businesses. Title I
of the JOBS Act scaled down the reporting requirements of Securities Act
registration statements for any entity that qualifies as an “emerging growth
company.” 12 This category was defined in extremely broad terms, which
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c–77e (2012). For an overview of the registration process, see Registration
Under the Securities Act of 1933, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answer s/regis33.htm (last modified
Sept. 2, 2011).
8. See, e.g., infra note 103 and accompanying text.
9. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec. gov/about/la ws.shtml
(last modified Oct. 1, 3013).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
11. See, e.g., Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts’ Approach to Disclosure of Earnings
Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46
MD . L. REV. 1114, 1118 (1987).
12. JOBS Act § 102 (codified as amende d at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(a), 78m(a), 78n(i), 78n-1(e); 17
C.F.R. § 229.402 (2013)).

136

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 8

includes any issuer with “total annual gross revenue” of under $1 billion.13
The continued reporting requirements of the Exchange Act and SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) are also scaled down as long as the company keeps its
status as an emerging growth company. 14 In addition, such entities are
allowed to “test the waters” by communicating with qualified institutional
buyers and institutional accredited investors before a registration statement
is filed. 15 Draft versions of registration statements can also be submitted to
the SEC confidentially. 16
Title II of the JOBS Act changed the way private funds, including
hedge funds,17 private equity funds, 18 and venture capital funds, 19 will be
able to offer securities by lifting the previous ban on general solicitation
and advertising. 20 These funds rely on an exemption to the Securities Act
under Rule 506 of Regulation D. 21 In order to claim the exemption, the
securities must only be sold to accredited investors. 22

13. Id. § 101(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19)).
14. Id. §§ 102–04 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(a), 78m(a), 78n(i), 78n-1(e),
7213(a)(3), 7262(b)). “ Emerging gro wth company” is defined in the Securities Act at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(a)(19) and in the Exchange Act at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80).
15. JOBS Act § 105(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77e(d)).
16. Id. § 106(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77f(e)).
17. T he President’s Working Group on Financial Markets explains:
The term “hedge fund” is commonly used to describe a variety of different types of
investment vehicles that share some common characteristics. Although it is not statutorily
defined, the term encompasses any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized,
administered by professional money managers, and not widely available to the public.
P RESIDENT’ S W ORKING GRP . ON FIN . MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE , AND THE LESSONS OF
LONG -T ERM CAP ITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter P RESIDENT’ S W ORKING GRP .],
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf.
18. Private equity funds invest in, by definition, private equity. T hese are
[e]quity securities of companies that have not “ gone public” (are not listed on a public
exchange). Private equities are generally illiquid and thought of as a long-term investment. As
they are not listed on an exchange, any investor wishing to sell securities in private
companies must find a buyer in the absence of a marketplace.
Private Equity, VCE XP ERTS, https://vcexperts.com/encyclopedia/glossary/private-equity (last
visited Nov. 17, 2013).
19. “ An investment fund that manages money from investors seeking private equity stakes in
startup and small- and medium-size enterprises with strong growth potential. These investments
are generally characterized as high-risk/high-return opportunities.” Venture Capital Funds,
INVESTOP EDIA , http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/vcfund.asp#axzz297tOK0an (last visited
Nov. 17, 2013).
20. JOBS Act § 201 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144A(d)(1),
.506 (2013)).
21. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. T his Note will focus mainly on hedge fun ds rather than all
private funds.
22. Id.; see infra note 40 (defining “ accredited investor”).
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Title III of the Act created a brand new exemption to securities laws by
allowing companies to raise money through “crowdfunding” platforms. 23
This is accomplished through websites that allow businesses to raise up to
$1 million from a large number of investors.24 Although each contribution
may be small, the Internet allows a business owner to reach an unlimited
number of investors, and thus crowdfunding may revolutionize the way
small businesses raise capital. The website must register with the SEC as
either a broker-dealer or a “funding portal.” 25
Title IV of the Act amended section 3(b) of the Securities Act by
creating a new class of exempted securities for small businesses that are
raising a limited amount of capital. 26 Prior to the Act, a similar exemption
existed under Regulation A. 27 The new exemption created under the JOBS
Act, dubbed Regulation A+, 28 has been viewed as an expansion of
Regulation A, although it is technically a new exemption. 29 The JOBS Act
increased the amount of money that may be raised in these offerings from
$5 million to $50 million. 30 The issuer may rely on general solicitation, and
the securities may be freely resold, but the issuer must comply with several
requirements, which include providing investors with a simplified offering
circular and simplified financial statements. 31
Titles V and VI amended sections 12(g) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act
by raising the threshold of shareholders for mandatory registration. 32
Registration with the SEC is required from companies with over $10
million in assets and over 2000 shareholders, increased from 500. 33 Lastly,
Title VII simply instructs the SEC to make information regarding the JOBS

23. JOBS Act §§ 301–05 (codified as amen ded at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(6), 77d-1, 77r(b)(4),
(c)(1), (c)(2)(F), 78c(a)(80), (h), 78l(g)(6), 78o(i)(2)).
24. Id. § 302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6)).
25. T homas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities
Laws— Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1753–54 (2012). See infra note 90 (defining “ funding portal”).
26. JOBS Act § 401 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)).
27. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–63 (2013).
28. Louis A. Bevilacqua et al., JOBS Act Targets Smaller Business Capital Raising,
P ILLSBURY W INTHROP SHAW P ITTMAN LLP 4 (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.pillsburyla w.com
/siteFiles/Publications/CSAlertJumpstartOurBusinessesAct040512_final.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Rob Kaplan & Tom Voekler, Beyond Crowdfunding: Why Regulation A Reform
Is the Most Vital Piece of the JOBS Act, W ASH . P OST (June 13, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-13/business/35459353_1_initial-public-offeringsinvestors-jobs-act (“T he JOBS Act expands Regulation A’s annual dollar limit tenfold—from $5
million to $50 million.”).
30. JOBS Act § 401 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(A)).
31. Id. See also Small Business and the SEC, SEC, http://www. sec.gov/info/smallbus
/qasbsec.htm (last modified Oct. 10, 2013) (providing an overview of Regulation A).
32. JOBS Act §§ 501, 601 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g)(1), (4), (5)(A),
78o(d)).
33. Id. T itle VI and section 15(d) apply to banks and bank holdin g companies; T itle V an d
section 12(g) apply to companies other than banks and bank holding companies. Id.
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Act available online and to direct this information towards small businesses
and those owned by minorities, women, and veterans. 34
II. BACKGROUND OF THE JOBS ACT’S PROVISIONS AND
RESULTANT INVESTOR PROTECTION MECHANISMS
The three provisions of the JOBS Act analyzed here came about for
slightly different reasons, but all were passed with the general intent of
increasing small businesses’ access to capital and increasing employment.35
Although these provisions seek to ease the requirements for certain
companies issuing equity, several of the Act’s requirements seek to limit
the scope of each provision and safeguard investors. 36
A. TITLE II: PRIVATE FUNDS AND THE LIFTING
GENERAL SOLICITATIONS

OF THE B AN ON

i. Background and Legislative History
Hedge funds, although not a new concept, have seen substantial growth
in recent years. 37 This growth, combined with the government’s lack of
information regarding their operations,38 led to several proposals in the last
decade to regulate the industry. 39 For many years hedge funds have been
able to avoid registration under the Securities Act by not offering their
securities publicly, not advertising or engaging in general solicitation, and
only selling to accredited investors.40 Funds can also avoid the requirements
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 by limiting the number of beneficial owners and requiring investors
to meet investment minimums and the definition of a “qualified
purchaser.” 41
Although much of the commentary on Title II of the JOBS Act focuses
on hedge funds, the original legislative intent does not appear to consider
Id. § 701.
See infra Part II.A–C.
Id.
P RESIDENT’ S W ORKING GRP ., supra note 17, at 1.
STAFF OF SE C, I MP LICATIONS OF THE GROW TH OF HEDGE FUNDS vii (2003) [hereinafter
STAFF REP ORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefun ds0903.pdf.
39. Pallavi Gogoi & Barbara Hagen baugh, Geithner Seeks More Hedge Fund Regulations,
USA T ODAY (Mar. 27, 2009, 11:26 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies
/regulation/2009-03-26-hedge-funds-regulationt-geithner_N.htm; Registration Under the Advisers
Act of Certain Hedge Fun d Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2266, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec.
10, 2004).
40. STAFF REP ORT, supra note 38, at x. “ Accredited investor” is defined by Rule 501(a) of the
Sec urities Act. Besides certain institutional investors and insiders of the issuer, a natural person
may be accredited if he has a net worth of more than $1 million or has income of more than
$200,000 in each of the previous two years and a reasonable expectation of the same income level
for the current year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013).
41. STAFF REP ORT, supra note 38, at x.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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this sector of the financial industry. The bill was introduced by
Representative Kevin McCarthy as the Access to Capital for Job Creators
Act, which “would improve capital formation by expanding financing
options”42 —a purpose couched in general terms not unlike the JOBS Act as
a whole. The justification for the bill was that, due to the heightened
lending standards resulting from the financial crisis, traditional commercial
bank loans were increasingly difficult to obtain by small businesses.43
Congressional testimony of industry experts favored the proposal, asserting
that raising capital under the current regulation was too burdensome, as a
ban on general solicitation meant that investors needed a preexisting
relationship with the issuer. 44 Furthermore, because these investors were
required to qualify as accredited, they typically had a bigger appetite for
risk and needed fewer protections than less wealthy or sophisticated
investors. 45
Still, a problem remained—although purchasers would need
accreditation status, allowing advertising and general solicitation would
result in offers being extended to unaccredited investors, who might then
mislead the issuer as to their true level of wealth or sophistication. 46 To
assuage these concerns, the bill was amended to include a provision
directing the SEC to adopt rules requiring “the issuer to take reasonable
steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.” 47
ii. Investor Protection Mechanisms
Despite these safeguards, critics warned that the proposed SEC rules
threatened to undermine investor protection. 48 These new rules for hedge
funds come at a time when, for many years, proposals have been made to

42. Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, H.R. 2940, 112th Cong. (2012); Digest for H.R.
2940, HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONF., http://www.gop.gov/bill/112/1/hr2940 (last visited Nov. 17,
2013).
43. H.R. REP . NO . 112-263, at 2 (2011).
44. Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job Creation:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 35–36 (2011) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals Hearing] (statement of
Barry E. Silbert, Founder & CEO, SecondMarket).
45. Id. at 123; but see Pat Huddleson, Keeping Vigilant for Investment Fraud, P HYSICIAN’S
MONEY DIG . (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.physiciansmoneydige st.com/personal-finance/KeepingVigilant-for-Investment-Fraud (noting that doctors are often targets of investment fraud beca use
of their high wealth levels and lack of financial expertise).
46. Legislative Proposals Hearing, supra note 44, at 64 (statement of Heath Abshure,
Arkansas Securities Commissioner and Chairman of the Corporation Finance Committee of the
North American Securities Administration Association).
47. H.R. REP . NO . 112-263, at 1 (2011); 157 CONG. REC. H7290 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 2011)
(statement of Rep. Waters).
48. See, e.g., Press Release, U. S. Senator Carl Levin, Levin Statement on SEC’s Proposed
General Solicitation Rule (Aug. 29, 2012), available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom
/press/release/levin-statement-on-secs-proposed-general-solicitation-rule.
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increase, not decrease, regulation of the hedge fund industry. 49 There are
several valid reasons why regulating hedge funds is not a high priority.
First, despite their recent growth, hedge funds remain a relatively small part
of the financial sector. 50 In a 2007 speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke disagreed with these proposals for increased regulation and
argued that the invisible hand of the market would regulate itself. 51 He
noted that “[t]hus far, the market-based approach to the regulation of hedge
funds seems to have worked well, although many improvements can still be
made.”52 This is not to say that hedge funds can never pose systemic risk to
the financial system. 53 In 1998, a hedge fund run by Long Term Capital
Management nearly collapsed. 54 A failure of the fund could have had a
broader impact on the already fragile financial markets.55 Nine years later,
the subprime mortgage crisis led to the near collapse of two hedge funds at
Bear Stearns,56 which was one factor that led to the firm’s fire sale to
JPMorgan eight months later. 57
Even if regulators agreed that hedge funds posed too great a risk,
increased regulation would pose several problems. First, it is not clear that
increased regulation would even be able to contain risk in the industry, or
whether it would disrupt the existing market-based discipline. 58 A balanced
proposal is that while highly burdensome regulations may not be in the
economy’s best interest, regulations should, at a minimum, try to
understand the industry better. This decrease in opaqueness would allow for
a more tailored oversight regime. However, hedge funds are notoriously
secretive,59 and by making more information publicly available, the effect
49. See, e.g., Gogoi & Hagenbaugh, supra note 39.
50. P RESIDENT’S W ORKING GRP ., supra note 17, at 1.
51. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at New York University Law School:

Financial Re gulation and the Invisible Hand (Apr. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070411a.htm.
52. Id.
53. P RESIDENT’S W ORKING GRP ., supra note 17, at 2 (“ Although individually and as an
industry, hedge funds represent a relatively small segment of the market, their impact is greatly
magnified by their highly active trading strategies and by the leverage obtained through their use
of repurchase agreements and derivative contracts.”).
54. Id. at 12–14.
55. Id. at 20.
56. Julie Creswell & Vika s Baja j, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund, N.Y.
T IMES (June 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html.
57. Yalman Onaran, JPMorgan Chase to Buy Bear Stearns for $240 Million, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 17, 2008, 12:54 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=ne wsarchive&sid
=a4qrSYRFeOgI.
58. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Re serve, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006),
available at http://www.fe deralreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm (“ A risk
of any prescriptive regulatory regime is that, by creating moral hazard in the marketplace, it leaves
the system less rather than more stable.”).
59. Michael S. Schmidt, A Trader’s Train to Wall Street, Conn., N.Y. T IMES (Aug. 4, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/04/business/04reverse.html.
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may be to decrease funds’ competitive advantage, which again would
distort the current laissez-faire environment. 60 Thus, the benefits of hedge
funds would be reduced.
Once the disadvantages of increased regulation are understood, the next
step is to focus on determining the effects of decreased regulation. Critics to
the Act contend that allowing private funds to solicit to the general public
will cause unsophisticated investors to be inundated with advertisements
and offers for funds, which will lead to increased fraud. 61 However, as
mentioned, hedge funds prefer to remain out of the public eye. 62 This aspect
of the industry is even more evident as the financial crisis has brought
negative attention to the financial sector and the “one percent” of wealthy
Americans. 63 For this reason, some commentators have speculated that
private funds may not wish to advertise. 64
Another concern is whether increasing the solicitation opportunities of
these private funds will result in larger numbers of investments in such
funds as investors divert funds that ordinarily would have been invested in
safer vehicles such as mutual funds or tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs
or 401(k)s. 65 Private funds are often riskier than traditional funds and have
much less liquidity, making it more difficult for investors to access their
funds for extended periods of time. 66 However, many hedge funds already
have more than enough capital and often must turn away new investors.67
Additionally, hedge funds are typically only available to accredited

60. See Bernanke, supra note 58 (“ If several funds had similar positions, how wo uld
authorities avoid giving a competitive advantage to one fund over another in using the information
from the database?”).
61. See, e.g., Ronald D. Orol, Regulator Fears Fraud from Hedge-Fund Ad Rules, W ALL ST. J.
MARKETW ATCH , (Nov. 15, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-11-15
/economy/35126471_1_angel-investors-angel-capital-association-hedge-fund.
62. See, e.g., Phil Niles, The JOBS Act: Why It May Mean Nothing for Hedge Funds,
FINALTERNATIVES (June 11, 2012, 8:05 AM), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/20741; see
also Schmidt, supra note 59.
63. See, e.g., Talking About a Revolution: Occupy Wall Street and the Media, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 7, 2012, at 92, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21552179.
64. See, e.g., Hedge Fund Industry Cautious on JOBS Act, COOCONNECT (July 12, 2013),
http://cooconnect.com/news/hedge-fund-in dustry-cautious-jobs-act (quoting Charlie Nightingale,
senior counsel and head of legal and investment structuring at PAAMCO).
65. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, The Risks of Tapping Your Retirement Fund for Alternative
Investments, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 31, 2012, at B10, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10
/30/the-risks-of-tapping-a-retirement-fund-for-an-alternative-use/.
66. P RESIDENT’S W ORKING GRP ., supra note 17, at 3 (noting that hedge funds offer greater
returns, but also greater risk, than other investment benchmarks). Hedge funds frequently limit
redemptions by investors, a practice referred to as putting up a “ gate.” See, e.g., Juliet Chung &
Gre gory Zuckerman, Salient Says Fund Halts Investor Withdrawals, W ALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2012,
2:07
PM),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052970204098704578081262215522792.html.
67. Niles, supra note 62.
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investors,68 making it unlikely that the average person would have access to
these investments.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank or the Dodd-Frank Act) is an additional safeguard on the
hedge fund industry. 69 As part of the overall effort to regulate hedge funds,
or at least to increase their transparency, Dodd-Frank requires that hedge
funds now register with the SEC and increases the amount of information
reported to the agency.70 The Act also allows the SEC to conduct audits and
collect information on systemic risk. 71
B. TITLE III: US ING CROWDFUNDING PORTALS TO RAIS E CAPITAL
THROUGH THE INTERNET
i.

Background and Legislative History

The JOBS Act, by improving access to capital, addressed a problem
present in many small businesses. That is, when raising capital, the cost of
compliance with securities regulations may outweigh the benefit of the
financing. 72 One proposed solution was crowdfunding:
The concept of crowdfunding finds its root in the broader concept of
crowdsourcing, which uses the “crowd” to obtain ideas, feedback and
solutions in order to develop corporate activ ities. In the case of
crowdfunding, the objective is to collect money for investment; this is
generally done by using social networks, in part icular through the Internet
(Twitter, Facebook, Lin kedIn and different other specialized blogs). . . . In
other words, instead of raising the money from a very s mall group of
sophisticated investors, the idea of crowdfunding is to obtain it fro m a
large audience (the “crowd”), where each individual will provide a very
73
small amount.

Although crowdsourcing is attractive to small business startups, the
securities laws prior to the JOBS Act did not contain an exemption for such
a financing method. 74 Rule 506 of Regulation D, discussed in Part II.A, was
not a possibility before the JOBS Act because of the ban on general

68. See supra note 40 (defining “ accredited investor”).
69. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C. (2012)).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a), -3(b), -4(b).
71. Id. § 80b-4.
72. Joan MacLeod Hemin way & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 T ENN . L. REV. 879, 880 (2011).
73. Id. at 881 (quoting Paul Belleflamme et. al, Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd 2
(CORE Disc ussion Paper No. 2011/32, 2011), available at http://www2. dse.unibo.it/dsa/seminari
/610/Crowdfunding_BLS_13Feb2011.pdf).
74. Hazen, supra note 25, at 1744–49.
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solicitation and advertising. 75 Even after the Act lifted this ban, the rule
requires that all purchasers be accredited investors, and issuers must take
reasonable steps to verify such accreditation. 76 Rules 504 and 505 have
similar problems, which include bans on general solicitation, accreditation
standards, and a restricted securities status, meaning the securities may not
be freely resold by purchasers.77 Regulation A, discussed in Part II.C, is
another exemption for small businesses that allows for general
solicitation. 78 Although the exemption does not require issuers to complete
the full registration process, some financial statements and offering
circulars must be filed, 79 the cost of which may not be conducive for a small
startup seeking limited funding. 80
ii. Investor Protection Mechanisms
Crowdfunding became explicitly legal through Title III of the JOBS
Act.81 Several requirements pertaining to funding amounts must be met in
order to rely on this exemption. The Act limits the aggregate amount of
capital raised through the offering during any twelve-month period to $1
million. 82 The Act also limits the amount that may be sold to any one
investor. 83 If either the annual income or net worth of the investor is less
than $100,000, that investor may only invest up to the greater of $2000 or
five percent of his annual income or net worth. 84 If either the annual income
or net worth is greater than $100,000, the investor may not invest more than
ten percent of his annual income or net worth, and in no instance may he
invest more than $100,000. 85
Congress had at least two purposes in drafting the investment limits.86
First, the general concept of crowdfunding was a response to the demand of
startups and small businesses for which the traditional methods of capital
raising were not accessible. 87 By allowing these companies to seek funding
from the “wisdom of the crowd,” businesses could seek small investments

75. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013) (to be amended by JOBS Act § 201, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012)).
76. JOBS Act § 201(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012) (codified as
amended at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506).
77. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–05.
78. Id. §§ 230.251–63.
79. Id. §§ 230.252–53.
80. See infra Part II.C.
81. JOBS Act §§ 301–05 (codified as amende d at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(6), 77d-1, 77r(b)(4),
(c)(1), (c)(2)(F), 78c(a)(80), (h), 78l(g)(6), 78o(i)(2)).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A).
83. See id. § 77d(a)(6)(B).
84. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i).
85. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii).
86. See 157 CONG . REC. S8458 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley).
87. Id.
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from a large number of investors. 88 Second, by explicitly limiting the
investment amount, Congress limited the exposure and thus the risk borne
by any individual investor. 89
A further condition requires that the transactions take place through an
intermediary designated as a broker or “funding portal,” 90 either of which
must be registered with the SEC.91 Both the issuer and intermediary are
subject to additional requirements. 92 For example, an intermediary may not
compensate promoters or lead generators for providing identifying
information of any potential investor. 93 The issuer, in keeping with the
overall goal of disclosure and transparency, must register certain
information with the SEC pertaining to the identity of the issuer and its
officers,94 the financial condition of the company,95 and a description of the
nature and purpose of the offering; 96 this information must be made
available to investors as well. 97 The importance of these registrations
becomes more apparent due to a private cause of action created by the
statute: issuers are liable to investors for any material misstatements or
omissions. 98
C. TITLE IV: REGULATION A+ OFFERINGS

FOR SMALL

B US INES SES

i. Background and Legislative History
Regulation A+ increased the amount of capital available through a
limited offering from $5 million to $50 million. 99 One of the main reasons
for increasing this ceiling was that very few companies were actually using
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. “ Funding portal” is a new term defined by section 3(a)(80) of the Exchange Act:
The term “funding portal” means any person acting as an intermediary in a transaction
involving the offer or sale of securities for the account of others, solely pursuant to section
4(6) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77d(6)) that does not— (A) offer investment
advice or recommendations; (B) solicit purchases, sales, or offers to buy the securities offered
or displayed on its website or portal; (C) compensate employees, agents, or other persons for
such solicitation or based on the sale of securities dis- played or referenced on its website or
portal; (D) hold, manage, possess, or otherwise handle investor funds or securities; or (E)
engage in such other activities as the Commission, by rule, determines appropriate.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(80) (2012).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(1). The broker or funding portal must be registered, not the securities
themselves.
92. Id. § 77d-1.
93. Id. § 77d-1(a)(10).
94. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(A)–(C).
95. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D).
96. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1)(E).
97. Id. § 77d-1(b)(1).
98. Id. § 77d-1(c).
99. Id. § 77c(b)(2)(A).
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the exemption. 100 Although Regulation A is an exemption to the traditional
registration process, it still requires that some financial statements and
offering circulars be prepared and filed with the SEC, albeit a much less
rigorous process than a full public offering. 101 Because of this, the process
is sometimes referred to as a “mini-registration.” 102 However, this results in
an offering cost which, when combined with the $5 million limit, becomes
prohibitively expensive. 103 By some estimates, between three and seven
companies completed Regulation A offerings in 2010. 104 Indeed, Congress
had this issue in mind previously and has raised the initial exemption of
$100,000 several times.105 The ceiling was raised to $300,000 in 1945,
$500,000 in 1972, $2 million in 1978, and $5 million in 1980. 106 The new
Regulation A+ contains a similar provision that allows the SEC to review
the amount every two years and raise the maximum if necessary. 107
The purpose behind the original Regulation A exemption, like the
purpose behind the JOBS Act, was to grant small businesses easier access
to capital. 108 Small businesses are an integral part of the economy, 109 but the
current state of the credit markets makes it difficult for many to obtain
financing. 110 Regulation A+ lowers many of the barriers to capital raising
that were present in its predecessor.111 The Act raises the cap of the offering
from $5 million to $50 million. 112 Further, Regulation A+ securities will be
treated as “covered” securities, meaning they will be exempt from state blue
sky laws if they are listed on a national exchange or if offers and sales are
made to “qualified purchasers.” 113

100. See SE C Advisory Comm. on Small & Emer ging Buss., Presentation Slides (Oct. 31,
2011),
available
at
http://www. sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec
/acsec103111presentation.pdf.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251–63 (2013).
102. Harvey Frank, The Processing of Small Issues of Securities Under Regulation A, 1962
DUKE L.J. 507, 508.
103. Id. at 507.
104. H.R. REP . NO . 112-206, at 3 (2011); SEC Advisory Comm. on Small & Emerging Buss.,
supra note 100.
105. H.R. REP . NO . 112-206, at 3.
106. Id. Although Congress a uthorized the SEC to use the $5 million maximum in 1980, the
SEC did not actually raise it to this level until 1992. Id.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(5).
108. Frank, supra note 102, at 507.
109. H.R. REP . NO . 112-206, at 4 (2011); see also Council of Econ. Advisers, Annual Report of
the Council of Economic Advisers, in ECONOMIC REP ORT OF THE P RESIDENT 7, 67 (2012)
[hereinafter Council of Econ. Advisers], available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/sites/defa ult
/files/microsites/ERP_2012_Complete.pdf.
110. Small Business Lending: Field Hearing Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 19
(2010) (statement of Robert Blaney, Arizona District Director, U.S. Small Business
Administration).
111. See JOBS Act § 401; 17 C.F.R. § 251–63 (2013).
112. JOBS Act § 401.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D). “ Qualified purchasers” is a term to be defined by the SEC. Id.
§ 77r(b)(4)(D)(ii).
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As with the old Regulation A, the securities may be publicly sold.114
The securities may also be resold freely by the purchaser. 115 Another
provision included from the old Regulation A allows issuers to “test the
waters” by soliciting interest before filing the offering statement. 116
ii.

Investor Protection Mechanisms
The increased availability of the exemption has led to criticism that
fewer requirements for raising capital will lead to an increase in fraud.117
Although many provisions favor issuers, the Act also includes some
protections for investors. First, issuers must provide audited financial
statements with the offering circulars and must file updated audited
financial statements with the SEC annually. 118 The SEC can also require the
issuers to file and disseminate non-financial information such as a
discussion of business operations and corporate governance principals.119
Regulation A only requires unaudited financial statements, and those
statements need to be filed once, rather than continuously. 120
Second, although the JOBS Act grants certain Regulation A+ offerings
an exemption from blue sky laws, the exemption only applies if the
securities are listed on a national exchange or sold only to qualified
investors; 121 therefore, many Regulation A+ offerings will still be subject to
state securities laws. The Act also requires that a study be performed on the
effect of blue sky laws on Regulation A+ offerings, 122 which may affect
SEC rulemaking in the future. 123
Third, a disqualification rule exists for certain “bad actors.” 124
Regulation A has a similar provision under Rule 262, which bars issuers,
affiliates, or underwriters who are subject to administrative orders or
injunctions involving certain securities laws from utilizing the
exemption. 125 Certain criminal convictions also prevent a party from using
the exemption. 126 Regulation A+ directs the SEC to promulgate a rule
substantially similar to regulations found in the Dodd-Frank Act, which

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. § 77c(b)(2)(B).
Id. § 77c(b)(2)(C).
Id. § 77c(b)(2)(E).
H.R. REP . NO . 112-206, at 13 (2011).
15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(F).
Id. § 77c(b)(2)(G)(i).
17 C.F.R. § 230.251–63 (2013).
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D).
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 402, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012).
Benjamin M. Hron, JOBS Act May Make It Easier for Emerging Companies to Raise
Capital, MCCARTER & ENGLISH , LLP (Apr. 2012), http://www.mccarter.com/files/Uploads
/Images/EmergingBusinessAlert_Apr2012.pdf.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(G)(ii).
125. 17 C.F.R. § 230.262.
126. Id.
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prohibit certain actors from using Rule 506. 127 Practitioners have
recommended that the SEC amend Rule 262, which applies to Regulation A
offerings, to conform to the new rule concerning Regulation A+
offerings. 128
III. INVESTOR PROTECTIONS OUTSIDE THE JOBS ACT
COMMON TO ALL EXEMPTIONS
A. EXTRA-STATUTORY M ECHANIS MS : NEGOTIATION AND
VALUATION IN SMALL B US INES S INVES TMENTS
In addition to the investor protections built into the JOBS Act, the
current investing environment provides several other safeguards. Investing
in a small business is usually done through an arm’s-length transaction;
investors will do their own due diligence and understand the risks. 129
Indeed, investing in small businesses is inherently risky—a majority of
small businesses fail within a few years.130 However, risk is valued into
investment: the riskier the proposition, the less investors will be willing to
pay for it (through lower share prices for equity investments), and the more
protections they will demand (through higher interest rates and other
covenants for loans).131 As a result, some companies are choosing to go
beyond what the JOBS Act requires. 132 Unlike Titles II, III, and IV, which
still require SEC rulemaking in order to be implemented, Title I of the
JOBS Act went into effect immediately. 133 From the time that the Act was
127. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(G)(ii); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d).
128. Letter from Catherine T . Dixon, Chair, Fed. Re gulation of Sec. Comm., Bus. La w Section,

Am. Bar Ass’n, to SEC 10–11 (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www. sec.gov/comments/jobstitle-iv/jobstitleiv-13.pdf.
129. See Claudia Lin g-Yun Zhang, How to Solve the Dilemma of Small Business Finance: A
Proposal for Credito rs’ Statutory Information Right, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 129, 145 (2012)
(analyzing the “ corporate obligations to creditors, particularly how variations on statutory
protection depend on bargaining bet ween contracting parties”); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a
Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN . L. REV. 1067, 1068–
76 (2003) (noting that venture capital firms are uniquely situated to take on the risk of start-up
financing and observing how venture capital contracting addresse s the problems of uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency costs).
130. A Consumer’s Guide to Small Business Investments, W ASH . ST. DEP ’T FIN . INS TI TUTIONS,
http://dfi.wa.gov/sd/sbinvestments.htm (last updated Jan. 29, 2010).
131. T he Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a theory of modern finance which uses risk
and expected return to value an investment. For a discussion of this theory and others, see Samuel
C. T hompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP . L. 457, 460 (1996).
132. See Jessica Holzer, Some Firms Shun Looser IPO Rules, W ALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578117322881014396.html.
Fiftyfive eligible companies were used in the calculation. Id.
133. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101–08, 126 Stat. 306, 307 (2012) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); JOBS Act Implementation Update: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Investigations, Oversight and Regulations of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 35
(2013) (statements of Lona Nallengara, Acting Director, Division of Corporation Finance, and
John Ramsay, Acting Director, Division of T rading & Markets, SEC).
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passed in April 2012 until November of the same year, eighty-five percent
of companies who were eligible to qualify as an “emerging growth
company” chose not to use the less demanding reporting requirements
because the cost savings did not outweigh the negative perception from
investors, who would attach a lower valuation to the security. 134 If investors
lack confidence because of a perception of increased fraud, then the cost of
capital would actually increase, which in turn would hurt job growth. 135
Interestingly, this suggests that the JOBS Act may not achieve its intended
purpose.
B. STATUTORY M ECHANIS MS UNDER EXIS TING SECURITIES LAWS
Existing securities laws provide some potential protections for investors
that remain in effect after the passage of the JOBS Act. Even if a securities
offering is exempt from registration requirements, the anti-fraud provisions
of the securities laws still apply. 136 However, such protections are not
without limitation. The SEC is authorized to bring civil actions seeking
injunctions or damages for violations of the securities laws.137 However, the
resources of the agency are limited, and enforcement actions may not
uncover all ongoing violations or deter future offenses.138 The Securities
Act also provides investors with private causes of action under certain
circumstances.139 However, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 heightened the pleading standard for some such claimants. 140 One
private action arises in section 11 of the Securities Act, under which an
issuer is liable for an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in a
registration statement.141 Purchasers are required to prove neither reliance

134. Holzer, supra note 132.
135. Id. (“[T ]he law would have the perverse effect of hurting job growth because it would
cause investors to place a lower value on companies that cut back on disclosures. T hat would, in
turn, raise their cost of capital.”).
136. See, e.g., Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital Directly from Investors: What Disclosu re
Does Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 J. CORP . L. 111, 112 (2002).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2012).
138. T roy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks at “The SEC Speaks in 2009” (Feb. 6,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch020609tap.htm.
[A]s an agency, the SEC has limited resources. Even if the agency’s budget increases, we still
will be faced with the challenge of allocating a finite number of people and funds. . . . [W]e
must consider how the consequent allocation of resources compromises our ability to do other
things that may more effectively advance our mission of protecting investors; maintaining
fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital formation.
Id.

139. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l.
140. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737

(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Section 11(a) provides:
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on the omission or misstatement nor intent of the issuer. 142 Damages are
limited to the difference between the offering price and the price of the
securities at the time of the suit. 143 Purchasers also have a cause of action
against the underwriter or any other parties who signed the registration
statement,144 though these parties can claim a “due diligence” defense that
they had no reason to believe the registration statement had a misstatement
or omission. 145 A clear limitation on this cause of action is that only
purchasers who acquired a security sold pursuant to a registration statement
may bring claims.
Although a registration statement is required for section 11, issuers who
sell securities without registering them in violation of the securities laws
may face liability under sections 5 and 12(a)(1).146 Purchasers have a cause
of action against a seller who issues a non-exempt security without
registering it. 147 Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act creates liability for
anyone who sells a security through a prospectus containing a material
misrepresentation or omission. 148 The definition of “prospectus” is
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring such
security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or
omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue . . .
enumerated parties, including those who signed the registration statement, directors of the issuer,
accountants, and underwriters. Id. § 77k(a).
142. See id. § 77k. An exception is that the presumption of reliance is rebutted if the plaintiff
acquired the security more than twelve months after the effective date of the registration
statement. Id. § 77k(a); see also T odd R. David et al., Heightened Pleading Requirements, Due
Diligence, Reliance, Loss Causation, and Truth-On-The-Market—Available Defenses To Claims
Under Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 11 T RANSACTIONS: T ENN. J. BUS. L. 53,
68 (2010).
143. Id. § 77k(g).
144. Id. § 77k(a).
145. Id. § 77k(b)(3).
146. Id. §§ 77e, 77l(a)(1).
147. Id.
148. Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act provides:
Any person who—offers or sells a security, whether or not exempted by the provisions of
section 3, other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) thereof, by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b), to the person purchasing such security
from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any
income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the securities.
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extremely broad and includes nearly any communication that offers a
security for sale. 149 The purchaser must not know of the misstatement or
omission at the time of the transaction. 150
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act is a key antifraud provision making
it unlawful “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” “obtain
money or property” through misstatements or omissions, or “engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 151 Although courts previously
found an implied private right of action in section 17(a), that position has
become more disfavored. 152 The SEC, however, continues to use this
provision. 153
While the Securities Act and Exchange Act provide a backbone, more
recent legislation has added to this body of law. In response to the
accounting scandals at Enron and several other companies, the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (SOX Act) was passed with the goal of protecting
investors by “improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate
disclosures.”154 This law primarily concerns public companies, their board
of directors and management, and their accounting firms; 155 thus many
small businesses would not be affected. The Dodd-Frank Act, however,
affords a more recent and sweeping change of the legal landscape. DoddFrank, signed just two years before the JOBS Act,156 ushered in a new era
of financial regulation and undoubtedly increased government oversight of,
and regulatory requirements for, companies that affect the financial stability
of the United States. 157 These changes include the consolidation and
creation of regulatory agencies, consumer protection reforms, and an
increased availability of tools for financial crises. 158 Perhaps the JOBS Act
was a way to ensure that smaller companies would not be overburdened by
the increased regulations of Dodd-Frank. When viewed in this light, the
amount of regulation as a whole for capital raisers has increased, not
decreased.

Id. § 77l(a)(2).
149. Id. § 77b(a)(10).
150. Id. § 77l(a)(2).
151. Id. § 77q(a).
152. 4 T HOMAS LEE HAZEN , T HE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.22 (6th ed. 2009).
153. See, e.g., SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
154. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, pmbl., 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
155. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211–20 (establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board); id. §§ 78j-1(g)–(l) (regarding a uditors); id. §§ 7241–44 (imposing obligations of corporate
responsibility on officers and directors).
156. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
157. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
158. Id.
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In addition to using federal securities laws, purchasers may be able to
state a fraud claim under common law.159 This cause of action differs from
state to state and often requires a plaintiff to prove eight or nine elements.160
However, certain class action securities lawsuits may be preempted by
federal law under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(SLUSA). 161
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE JOBS ACT AND SUPPLY-SIDE
ECONOMICS ON EMPLOYMENT
A. THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION LEADING UP TO THE JOBS ACT
The American unemployment rate162 hit 4.4% in October of 2006—the
lowest point in a decade. 163 However, the recession officially began on
December 1, 2007, 164 and in the spring of 2008, rising unemployment
began to shed light on this fact.165 In October 2008, President Bush signed a
$700 billion bailout of the financial system through the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which established the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP).166 President Obama then signed an $831 billion
159. Joshua D. Ratner, Stockholders’ Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law After the
Uniform Standards Act Of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2001).
160. Dougla s M. Branson, Securities Litigation In State Courts— Something Old, Something
New, Something Borrowed . . . ., 76 W ASH . U. L.Q. 509, 512 (1998); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND ) OF T ORTS § 531 (1977) (“ One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to
liability to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or to
refrain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation, for pecuniary loss suffered by them
through their justifiable reliance in the type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to
expect their conduct to be influenced.”).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2012); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit,
547 U.S. 71 (2006) (addressin g the issue of the scope of SLUSA’s “ in connection with”
langua ge); Eliza beth C. Schauber, Note, Developing a Precise Definition: The Fifth Circuit
Addresses the Scope of the “In Connection With” Requirement Under SLUSA, 7 BROOK . J. CORP .
FIN . & COM. L. 561 (2013) (exploring and endorsing the Fifth Circuit’s adoption of the Ninth
Circuit’s more than tangentially related SLUSA standard in Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 (5th
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 978 (Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 12-88), which is currently before the
Supreme Court on appeal).
162. Persons are considered unemployed “ if they do not have a job, have actively looked for
work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work.” Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STA T. http://data.bls.gov/timeseries
/LNS14000000 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Labor Force Statistics]. As a result, the
category does not include those who are underemployed or not currently seeking employment.
163. Id. The unemployment rate reached 4.4% again in December 2006, March 2007, and May
2007. Id.
164. Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, NAT’L BUREAU ECON .
RES., http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf (last modified Dec. 11, 2008).
165. Michael M. Grynba um, Unemployment Rate Rises After 80,000 Jobs Cut, N.Y. T IMES
(Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/business/04cnd-econ.html.
166. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(codified as amende d at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–61) (2012)). As of May 2013, the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that $428 billion of the originally authorized $700 billion would be paid
to T ARP. CONG . BUDGET OFFICE , REP ORT ON THE T ROUBLED ASSET RELIEF P ROGRAM—MAY
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stimulus package known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009. 167 The stimulus included tax cuts, extended unemployment
benefits, and direct investments in infrastructure.168 Despite these efforts,
the unemployment rate reached 10% in October 2009 and was 8.1% in
April 2012 when the JOBS Act was passed. 169
B. DEREGULATION

AS A TOOL AGAINS T UNEMPLOYMENT

The stated purpose of passing the JOBS Act, as the title suggests, was
to create jobs. 170 The sponsors of the Act contended that allowing small
businesses to avoid regulations while raising capital would have the effect
of those enterprisers hiring a larger workforce. 171 The assertion that
businesses need access to capital is not subject to much debate. A report to
the President noted that “[e]conomists have modeled a link between the
supply of credit and macroeconomic activity” and that “[c]redit conditions
have been shown to affect a variety of specific macroeconomic outcomes,
including investment spending, inventories, and economic growth and
development.” 172 However, another link in the chain is needed to get from
general economic growth to increased employment.
Proponents of the JOBS Act assert that decreasing the amount of
regulations that companies face will increase hiring. 173 Instituting
deregulation in an attempt to increase economic activity is part of a strategy
known as supply-side economics. 174 This approach is achieved mainly
through lower marginal tax rates, which in turn increases after-tax returns
2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44256
_T ARP.pdf.
167. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). In February 2012, the Congressional Budget
Office revised the estimated impact of the law from $787 billion to $831 billion. CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE , P UB. NO . 4435, ESTIMATED I MP ACT OF THE AMERI CAN RECO VERY AND REINVES TMENT
ACT ON EMP LOYMENT AND ECONOMIC OUTP UT FROM OC TOBER 2011 T HROUGH DECEMBER
2011, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbo. gov/sites/defa ult/files/cbofile s/attachments/02-22ARRA.pdf.
168. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2012).
169. Labor Force Statistics, supra note 162.
170. “ An Act [t]o increase American job creation and economic growth.” JOBS Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-106, pmbl., 126 Stat. 306, 306 (2012).
171. See Jim Abrams, House Passe s Bipartisan JOBS Act to Help Startups and Small
Businesses, OF F. MAJORI TY LEADER (Mar. 8, 2012), http://majorityleader.gov/blog/2012/03
/house-passes- bipartisan-jobs-act-to-help-startups-and-small-businesse s.html
(quoting
Representative Stephen Fincher, who said, “ Reduc ing these regulations will help small companies
raise capital, grow their business and create private jobs for Americans”).
172. Council of Econ. Advisers, supra note 109, at 68.
173. Press Release, Rep. Eric Cantor, Leader Cantor Statement on the President Signing the
JOBS Act (Apr. 5, 2012), available at http://majorityleader.gov/newsroom/2012/04/leader-cantorstatement-on-the-president-signing-the-jobs-act.html.
174. See Supply-Side Economics, LAFFER CENTER, http://www.laffercenter.com/supply-sideeconomics/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
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on labor and investment. 175 The increased supply is thought to have a
“trickle down” effect.176 The broader policy mix of supply-side economic
theory asserts that, besides lower tax rates, free trade and decreased
regulation are key to economic growth. 177 Many economists, however,
disagree with the ability of a deregulatory policy to increase economic
growth in general and doubt it can create a positive effect on employment
specifically. 178
While it is true that securities regulations create barriers to capital
access for small businesses, these enterprises frequently cite to other
problems as having a higher priority. 179 In a 2012 survey, small business
owners ranked “cost of health insurance” and “uncertainty over economic
conditions” as their top two problems, with “unreasonable government
regulations” ranked fifth. 180 As a category, tax concerns ranked higher than
regulatory concerns,181 suggesting that taxes are increasingly complex and
more costly to deal with than regulations. But lowering taxes may not have
the impact on employment that some policy makers expect. The Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities noted that “[s]mall business employment rose
by an average of 2.3 percent (756,000 jobs) per year during the Clinton
years, when tax rates for high-income filers were set at very similar levels
to those that would be reinstated under President Obama’s budget.”182
However, during the Bush administration, when the tax rates were lower,
“employment rose by just 1.0 percent (367,000 jobs).” 183
Admittedly, while these responses suggest that taxes are more of a
priority than regulations, government intrusion clearly still plays a role in
decision-making and attempts at growth in small businesses. One reason is
that it costs small businesses more per employee to comply with federal
regulations than larger firms. 184 Although regulations are a concern of small
175. Id.
176. Trickle

Down
Theory,
I NVESTOP EDIA ,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t
/trickledowntheory.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
177. Supply-Side Economics, supra note 174.
178. See, e.g., P AUL KRUGMAN , THE RETURN OF DEP RESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CR ISIS OF
2008, at 182 (2009) (“T he specific set of foolish ideas that has laid claim to the name ‘supply-side
economics’ is a crank doctrine that would have had little influence if it did not appeal to the
prejudice s of editors and wealthy men.”); Richard Butrick, The Trickle-Down Hoax, AM.
T HINKER (July 15, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/07/the_trickle-down_hoax.html.
179. See HOLLY W ADE, SMALL BUSINESS P ROBLEMS AND P RIORITIES 5 (2012), available at
http://www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/research/studie s/small- business-problems-priorities2012-nfib.pdf.
180. “ Uncertainty over Government Actions” was fourth. Id.
181. See id. at 6.
182. Jason Levitis & Chuck Marr, History Contradicts Claim That President’s Budget Would
Harm Small Business Job Creation, CENTER ON BUDGET & P OL ’ Y P RIORITIES 1 (Mar. 26, 2009),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-26-09tax2.pdf.
183. Id.
184. See NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN , T HE IMP ACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON
SMALL FIRM S iv (2010), available at http://www. sba. gov/sites/defa ult/files/T he%20Impact%20of
%20Regulatory%20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full).pdf.
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business owners, statistical analysis suggests that government regulation
does not have the effect on employment that the Act’s sponsors claimed.185
Numbers from the Congressional Budget Office estimate that in 2011, only
0.4% of jobs lost were due to “government regulation/intervention.”186
Moreover, economists and policy makers, even those who once championed
deregulation, have begun to reverse position. Bruce Bartlett, a former
economist to the Reagan administration, recently claimed the idea that
deregulation would lead to significant job growth is “just nonsense. It’s just
made up.” 187
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN SPECIAL INTERESTS AND ECONOMIC THEORY
In the first presidential debate of 2012, President Obama stood by his
position that the financial system lacked sufficient control prior to the
recession: “Does anybody out there think that the big problem we had is
that there was too much oversight and regulation of Wall Street? Because if
you do, then Governor Romney is your candidate. But that’s not what I
believe.”188 Yet just six months prior to making this statement, the President
signed a JOBS Act that was described as one which was “premised on the
dangerous and discredited notion that the way to create jobs is to weaken
regulatory protections.” 189 This conundrum can be partially understood by
analyzing the various interests that went into the JOBS Act. Although the
surface of this analysis seems to point to a balance between access to
capital, job creation, and investor protection, several other interests came
into play with the passage of the JOBS Act. The Act was as much a creature
of politics as economic theory.

185. See David Edwar ds, Study Proves Regulations Killed Practically No Jobs, RAW STORY
(Nov. 14, 2011, 11:53 AM), http://www.ra wstory.com/rs/2011/11/14/study-proves-regulationskilled-practically-no-jobs/ (discussing environmental regulations).
186. Id. (citing News Release, U. S. Burea u of Labor Statistics, Extended Mass Layoffs—T hird
Quarter 2011 tbl. 2 (Nov. 9, 2011), available at http://www. bls.gov/ne ws.release/archives
/mslo_11092011.pdf).
187. Charles Ba bington, Bruce Bartlett, Ex-Reagan Economist: Idea That Deregulation Leads
To Jobs ‘Just Made Up,’ HUFFINGTON P OST (Oct. 30, 2011, 1:07 PM),
http://www.h uffingtonpost.com/2011/10/31/gop-candidates-plans-on-economy-housing_n_
1066949.html.
188. President Barack Obama & Former Governor Mitt Romney, Presidential Debate at the
University of Denver 29 (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://www.de bates.org/modules
/Printing/createpdf.php?pageid=111&returnid=111. Governor Romney’s position was that certain
regulations needed to be rolled back in order to help small business. In the same debate he stated
one part of his five-point plan was to “ champion small business. It’s small busine ss that creates
the jobs in America, and over the last four years, small business people have decided that America
may not be the place to open a new busine ss beca use ne w business startups are do wn to a 30-year
low.” Id. at 4.
189. Letter from Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. et al. to U.S. Senators T imothy
Johnson & Richard Shelby (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/news/467.
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“Political economy” is defined as “[t]he study and use of how economic
theory and methods influences political ideology.” 190 This discipline covers
a broad group of competing interests because various individuals and
groups are often competing for a finite number of resources.191 Because
competing groups have different interests and yield influence in various
ways, there often seems to be a disconnect between economic theory and
politics. 192 So what explanations account for the Act’s passage, and which
groups benefited?
One possible explanation is that Republicans simply pushed a bill
through to further their goal of deregulation. Jesse Rothstein, an economics
professor at the University of California, Berkeley, believed that “[i]t’s
game playing to try to pretend like they’re doing something” and “they
know they have to put up something that has the label ‘job creation’ on it,
whether or not it would work.”193 Republicans pushed a similar package of
jobs bills in the months leading up to the 2012 election, and many of these
were aimed at reducing environmental regulations, analogous to the
securities regulations that were relaxed through the JOBS Act. 194 This
suggests that the JOBS Act may have been part of a broader partisan
strategy of deregulation.
However, this view may be too cynical and even hints at deceptiveness
on the part of politicians. While the two-party system of the American
legislative branch often leads to partisan conflict, 195 the role of politics and
of special interests is to allow for the representation of parties who hold
differing views on the role of government and the extent of free-market
capitalism. At the same time, politicians understand the give-and-take
nature of negotiations and must often compromise to further their ultimate
goals. 196 An inquiry into the different groups served by the JOBS Act and
the overall political landscape provides more clues.

190. Political Economy, INVESTOP EDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/politicaleconomy.asp#axzz2EWIW46oY (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
191. See id.
192. See Jonathan Baron et al., Citizens’ Perceptions and the Disconnect Between Economics
and Regulatory Policy, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN : T HE CRISIS O F CONFIDENCE I N U. S.
REGULATION 143 (Cary Coglianese e d., 2012) (sugge sting that public perceptions, by influencing
legislation, are the cause of inefficient regulations); see also T heo Francis, Six Policies
Economists Love (And Politicians Hate), NPR (July 19, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://www.npr.org
/blogs/money/2012/07/19/157047211/six-policies-economists-love-and-politicians-hate.
193. Erin Mershon, Republican Jobs Bill Won’t Actually Create Jobs, Say Economists,
HUFFINGTON P OST (July 24, 2012, 10:11 AM), http://www.h uffingtonpost.com/2012/07/24
/republican-jobs-bills_n_1687647.html.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., Richard Rubin, Republicans Reprise 2011 Debt-Limit Threat in Cliff Talks,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www. bloomberg.com/ne ws/2012-12-03/republicansreprise-2011-debt-limit-threat-in-cliff-talks.html.
196. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux & Dwight R. Lee, Politics as the Art of Confined
Compromise, 16 CATO J. 365 (1997).
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One such party-in-interest was the labor movement, which—one would
think—ordinarily favors laws aimed at increasing employment. However,
the nation’s largest labor organizations were opposed to the Act’s
passage.197 The American Federation of Labor asked Congress “to set aside
the politics of the 1%, the old game of special favors for Wall Street, and
turn to the business of real job creation. The labor movement strongly
opposes the JOBS Act and any other effort to weaken the Dodd-Frank
Act.” 198
And deceptiveness does not seem present as Republican politicians, for
their part, made no effort to disguise their agenda of rolling back
regulations imposed by Dodd-Frank. 199 Thus, as mentioned in Part III.B,
perhaps the purpose of this deregulation was to assist small businesses that
may be overburdened by costly laws and rules. As outlined in Part IV.B,
federal regulations are usually more costly for small businesses because of
the economies of scale. 200
One particularly noteworthy subset of small businesses is technology
startups. As manufacturing jobs continue to be outsourced to emerging
economies, 201 Silicon Valley continues to play an increasingly important
role in U.S. economic growth. 202 But after the recessions of 2001 and 2008,
increased regulations that were perhaps unwarranted may have impacted the
industry. 203 The JOBS Act, therefore, may have been an attempt for
Congress and Obama to win back the technology sector, which is driven in
large part by small start-ups. Even larger technology companies like Google
welcomed the new law. 204

197. The Jobs Act—A Cynical and Dangerous Return to the Politics of Financial Deregulation,
AFL-CIO (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/EC- Statements/The-JobsAct-A-Cynical-and-Dangerous-Return-to-the-Politics-of-Financial-Deregulation.
198. Id.
199. Peter Schroeder, House GOP Advances Measure Rolling Back Dodd-Frank Provisions,
HILL (Apr. 18, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions
/222385-house-gop-advances-measure-rolling-back-dodd-frank.
200. See supra note 184.
201. See, e.g., Peter Dizikes, The High Price of Losing Manufacturing Jobs, FISCAL T IMES
(Feb. 26, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/02/26/The-High-Price-of-LosingManufacturing-Jobs.aspx.
202. For example, Silicon Valley attracted nearly one-third of all venture capital investments in
the United States in the first quarter of 2010. P RICEWATERHOUSE COOP ERS, MONEYT REE
REP ORT: Q1 2010 US RESULTS 5 (2010), available at http://findcapital.files.wordpress.com
/2010/05/moneytree-report-executive-summary.pdf; see also Zvika Krieger, So What If Tech
Start-Ups Are Small? Their Job-Creation Impact Is Big, ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2012, 9:07 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/10/so-what-if-tech-start-ups-are-small-theirjob-creation-impact-is-big/263332/.
203. Eric Alden, Primum Non Nocere: The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Silicon Valley, 8
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 107, 127 (2011).
204. Pablo Chavez, Bipartisanship, New Businesses and New Jobs, with a Little Help from Your
Friends, GOOGLE P UB. P OL’ Y BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com
/2012/03/bipartisanship-new-businesses-and-new.html.
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A reason for this attempt at “winning back” certain sectors of business
has to do with the negotiation aspect of politics mentioned above. 205 These
events all transpired during an election year. In effect, Obama and his
Democratic supporters may also be a beneficiary of the JOBS Act, albeit
indirectly.
CONCLUSION
Employment has been at the forefront of political and economic debate
as a result of the recent recession. The JOBS Act was passed with the
express purpose of increasing employment. As commentators and
representatives of various industries assailed the new legislation as
dangerous to investor protection, many did not see the simple truth directly
in front of them: the act may not fulfill its purpose of creating jobs. 206 Some
other areas of the law seem not to add up as well. One example discussed
was that while many think allowing hedge funds to no longer face a ban on
general solicitation will harm investors, others think the industry will not be
affected. 207 Additionally, companies are choosing to go beyond what is
necessary when disclosing to investors because they know the entity’s value
will increase. 208
While safeguarding investors is important, it must be balanced against
other policy interests. The SEC, in its own mission statement, declares that
its purpose is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.” 209 On top of these public policy
concerns, unemployment continues to hurt many citizens. As a result, the
government should continue efforts to increase employment. However,
having too many interests involved with the passage of this law has turned
it into what will amount to an unsuccessful attempt at job creation. At the
same time, the JOBS Act will likely not harm investors to the extent many
commentators believed.
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